* Day 49: Monday, September 30 * Day 52: Thursday, October 3 * Day 50: Tuesday, October 1 * Day 53: Friday, October 4 * Day 51: Wednesday, October 2
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Abbreviations used in notes:
DC = Don Campbell (Defense)
SF = Shelagh Franklin (Defense)
GW = George Wool (Defense)
ST = Sheldon Tate (Defense)
MA = Manuel Azevedo (Defense)
HR = Harry Rankin (Defense)
LB = Lance Bernard (Crown)
JF = Jennifer Fawcus (Crown)
J = Judge
Before the morning starts, Toby tells Trond of her weekend. She, Percy and her kids went up to Gustafsen Lake to check out the burned down arbour and the levelled cabin. To their surprise, Staff Sgt. Martin Sarich, 100 Mile House Detachment commander, showed up in a cowboy hat and boots. He was accompanied by six other officers in similar attire. Sarich asked what Percy was doing there. Percy told him he was there to pray. Sarich fondled his handcuffs as he smiled and told Percy that he wasn't allowed to be there according to his bail conditions. "Mr. Rosette, you just don't seem to understand that this is Lyle James' property." Percy replied that he was allowed to be there with his lawyer.
When Sarich and his posse looked around, they found lawyers Sheldon Tate and Manuel Azevedo nearby, who confirmed that Percy and Toby were with them. Sarich's disappointment was apparent as he slinked away, his handcuffs empty. One officer was overheard while looking back at the blackened arbour, "They went through all that for this?"
MA - Seeking an order for the Crown to release communications tapes of Sept. 10-12. He doesn't want the Crown to put on any more witnesses dealing with these dates until these tapes are released. One channel of 16 has been released. He wants them all.
The last witness, Warrant Officer Trelnuk, misled the court. MA puts forward the letter from JF that stated the amount of rounds issued to each soldier. This is marked Ex. I for identification.
MA wants to set aside another day to argue for a view of the site. Also wants to discuss increasing the amount of daily compensation to the defendants. With the cold weather setting in, $40 a day will not be enough. Wants to also discuss the length of the trial. Wants a series of voirdires to discuss Dionne's statement, to discuss the negotiators. MA says we would be lucky to be finished in three months. Wouldn't be surprised to learn this takes four or five months. J: "Another four or five months?" MA points out that disclosures have been coming in dribs and drabs and mostly after the trial began. Now crucial witnesses have been dropped at the last minute and he's having serious doubts about how things are being handled by the Crown. J wants an expert to go over the radio tapes.
J says that if he has to tell the jury that trial will be nine months total and not three, he might have to declare a mistrial.
ST - Says the fault falls on the shoulders of the Crown. J doesn't want to put it all on the Crown. ST agrees with MA's observations that the Crown's handling of the trial is questionable.
GW - The situation regarding JoJo is still not resolved. His fitness could also affect how things unfold here.
JF - She wonders if MA's suggestion that things can't be worked out is correct. She suggests that things can be worked out. Points out that the witness list has been revised to prevent redundancy. Re: the voirdire for Dionne, says that this was scheduled to last one day. There is a new witness list which should help reduce some more redundancy.
J is reluctant to declare the mistrial at this point. "It would be a black eye to the justice system," referring to the time estimates. "It just seems to be slowly slipping out of control."
JF says that tapes could be available. He says that three days of transmissions on six channels will be very lengthy and will take a long time to do. Says there is a tape available that a police expert could go over in the court on a special machine.
HR - We want to have an expert look at it.
J wants the name of the Defense expert made available and then a peace officer will deliver tapes to him. This is fine with MA. J reluctant to stop trial while waiting for tapes. He realizes that Defense may have to recall witnesses after the tapes are released.
LB - Next witness (#45): Capt. Daniel Blanc (DB) (a Lt. during the standoff) - eight years in army. On Aug. 23/95, he was given a warning order by Lt. Col. Semianiev. He was told to prepare for deployment of 12 personnel and four Bisons as "battlefield taxis" to go to Chilliwack. He was field commander of army personnel. He was also crew commander for Yellow Bison. Major Ferguson was involved too, as was Captain MacDonald (liaison for logistic support for RCMP).
He says he was on-site commander at Zulu. Names military personnel that were with him. Was given a "broad brush" overview of what was going on at Gustafsen Lake. Also relied on media. He had a number of meetings in Calgary with Semianiev, whose only role was to provide personnel. Told they would be logistical support. RCMP didn't have armoured vehicles.
DB explains that each mission has rules of engagement regarding use of force. Once he was given rules, he handed them out to troops. Ex. 209 shown to DB. These are the rules. Says that these were the specific rules for Operation Wallaby. Says it was clear that this was an RCMP operation and they were only to use force to protect themselves or people in their care. Once members were briefed, and understood document, they would sign it. At back of exhibit, there is a photocopy of the plasticized card that all soldiers received with a summary of rules. DB says that cards were turned in when they discovered that the card was too hard to understand and had spelling mistakes.
In Chilliwack, crew teams received Bisons. Then went to the Kamloops armouries where they remained until Sept. 5. Each Bison had two VHF radio systems. There was also an intercom system. The RCMP then fitted Bisons with one UHF police radio. Two of the Bisons were outfitted with sirens.
On Sept. 5, he received warning that two RCMP had been involved in a shooting and were in the bush near Gustafsen Lake and feared moving out of their position. They needed to be extracted. That day they went to marker 1147 where RCMP were. The Bisons escorted the RCMP out of the area. Later that day, they shuttled RCMP to various places.
He was told that he was under the command of the RCMP. He would only say no to a command if there was danger to personnel or to vehicles. Says that senior RCMP member in each vehicle called the shots. There was still a military chain of command, but once army personnel were assigned to Bison, they would take commands from RCMP. Soldiers could call DB at any time if there was a problem with commands. That never happened.
On Sept. 10, DB and Yellow were at "Monkey" and "Panther" with Prince Rupert ERT. Blue was there too. They understood there might be a surrender that day.
On the 11th, he heard that Red Bison had lost its steering chasing a "belligerent." He heard an explosion earlier, but didn't know what it was. Was listening to ERT radio so had an idea. He says that he and military had no part in the explosion.
They went south to cattle gate, and then drove east along lakefront. DB says the RCMP assessed that this manoeuver would draw fire away from the other Bisons. As they passed docks, he saw person 400 yards away in a treeline. Person was facing Yellow Bison. DB was looking through view port, as was driver. ERT members were standing with the hatches open. When he saw person in trees, DB could only see person from the waist up, as if he was in a ditch or hole. Couldn't see if person was carrying anything or if person was male or female. DB says that standing in rear is like standing in sunroof of car.
As they drove, he heard a strike to the rear left. Says the RCMP were firing as he heard this. He was able to determine that there was a strike at left rear tow hook at end of day when he was at Percy's lease.
When he was looking for Red Bison, DB asked one of the Bisons to "pop smoke" so he could locate them. He went up to a small clearing. All other three Bisons were there. Red and Green were ramp to ramp (back to back). Blue was on north side of other two awaiting further instructions. He could hear periodic gunfire coming from the Bisons directed at the treeline. Red driver told DB that he couldn't turn left or right, so DB decided to tow Red out. DB had Yellow drive around in a circle to see if there was anyone nearby. ERT members were out of hatches during this, looking for movement in the trees. No movement was detected.
He decided to create a "curtain of steel" so Red could be hooked up. Yellow was right forward of Red, Blue was left forward of Red, and Green was backed up to Red. DB observed hookup from view port and supervised. RCMP fired during this to north and west. Says that no military fired their weapons.
He knows that the ammo that army carried was for army use. Learned later that RCMP had used army ammunition. He knows he had 8,300 rounds of .223 and a couple hundred 9mm rounds. Each soldier had 120-150 rounds. Rest of the ammo was kept in the lockbins under the seats. Ammo in his Yellow Bison had been used by the RCMP. RCMP asked DB if he had any ammo. DB refused to give them his personnel ammo "because it was mine", but told police that there was ammo under the seats.
Once Red Bison was hooked up, DB told Green to pull Red to Zulu. Blue and Yellow went to Tiger South to extract RCMP members. At that time, he could see Blue, but didn't see any strike marks on it. He later observed that Yellow had a strike on its tow hook and Blue had bullet markings around crew commander's hatch.
DB stayed in Gustafsen Lake area until end.
HR - DB agrees that the rules of engagement were quite clear. HR recounts that Conners' responsibility was to ram the red truck. HR asks if this conforms to the rules. DB believes this did because it was ordered by the RCMP. HR wonders how this preserved his life. DB replies that the rules allow you to protect yourself. HR suggests that if the RCMP give you instructions, then you don't have to obey the rules. DB says that as long as the orders took into account the safety of the Bisons, the orders would be followed. DB clarifies that the rules of engagement are different from the mission requirements. He admits that he allowed the RCMP to use the army ammunition. HR: "I can see why we need inquiries." Jury chuckles and DB smiles.
DB reads from notes. "OP still sucks. Embarrassing lack of security. RCMP don't want to work with us." DB says he was disappointed with the amount of people coming in and out of the armouries. JF objects to this manner of cross examination. HR says he can't read DB's notes - they're not clear. J allows HR to continue. DB notes that RCMP took "native sensitivity" course. DB's notes say that RCMP has no concept of operations and that there is no on-site commander. The RCMP didn't have a platoon commander and as a result of all the team leaders running around, "there are too many chiefs." HR: "And not enough Indians." Wolverine laughs.
HR asks what DB's qualifications are. DB is not a driver, he was a platoon commander. HR asks if chasing a man through the woods with a 14-ton carrier was the proper use of the vehicle. DB says he can't comment because he wasn't there. DB agrees that taking some men to Hope for a day trip in the Bison wouldn't be proper use. DB says that if Warrant Officer Bidwell felt that the Bison could handle going through the forest, then the vehicle would be used properly. DB assumes that the Bison was driving through the woods with RCMP in the back so the police could dismount and effect an arrest. HR suggests that the real purpose was to run down the man. SB says this is an assumption. HR says DB made the assumption that the police were going to dismount.
DB says the army was just providing a taxi service. The RCMP were there to arrest. HR asks if Conners would have been in trouble if he thought ramming a red truck was unsafe. DB says that if Bidwell agreed, then they could have called DB with that concern. HR wonders what DB's reaction would have been had Conners and Bidwell called him on the night on the 10th. DB says he would have asked for details of the plan. HR says the plan was to blow the truck up. DB says that he would have asked for more details. DB says that "this was well within the rules of Warrant Officer Bidwell." Even knowing what he knew now, he would still support Bidwell's decision.
DB says he didn't issue the RCMP ammunition, he just let them have it. BD says that he doesn't know how many rounds were spent by Yellow, but Warrant Officer Trelnuk, his second in command, would. HR asks how Trelnuk would know this. DB says that he signed for all the ammo and would have noted how much he turned in. DB testifies he has no idea of how many army rounds were fired.
DB says there were 12 Prince Rupert ERT members and two dogs in his carrier that day. It was pretty cramped. DB says that army uses full metal jacket bullets while RCMP uses hollow point. Army not allowed to use hollow points. DB aware that Canada is a signatory against the use of land mines. DB says that data sheet wasn't a mine.
DB says Sgt. Schlueter had been asked for assistance with stun grenade. It went off and he lost thumb and first two fingers. Says that army was allowed to use stun grenades on this operation.
Army doesn't normally carry stun grenades. DB says he isn't aware of the circumstances of how Sgt. Schlueter got hold of stun grenades. He made a report early on and sent it up the chain of command. He and his driver never used stun grenades, but he would have allowed army personnel to use them if they felt it was necessary.
DB agrees that rules of engagement are the rules for using force. He doesn't recall army personnel ever pulling him aside with concerns about orders the RCMP had given them. Says that crew commanders never raised concerns and he believes that they are competent commanders.
ST - DB agrees that he takes pride in being in the army and serving his country and Queen. Agrees that part of training includes how to take orders and how to ensure they aren't in conflict with his vow to protect his country and Queen. At Gustafsen Lake, there were about 90 ERT men on the ground at any one time. The equivalent of about two army platoons. Agrees that police had no platoon commander equivalents.
DB believes that no Canadian soldiers fired any shots during the Gulf War, but agrees that Canada hasn't had much involvement in war since Korea.
DB agrees that as a platoon commander, it is important to understand the National Defense Act. Says he has never been given lectures about how an Attorney General of a province would call in the army, but is aware that provisions exist. He is also aware of the Criminal Code of Canada, including the reading of the Riot Act.
When he was given a warning order by Lt. Col Semianiev, he also had access to TV. Was not aware of the process of how the army was called in because that was happening a number of levels above him, but knew that the Attorney General would call Ottawa. Agrees that in a situation like this, it would be necessary to do this correctly. He has never been involved in an operation like this where the military was assisting the RCMP. DB agrees that there was sensitivity in this operation like in all operations at the planning stage. DB agrees that he was involved in careful planning even at this early stage.
He was not aware at the time that the Attorney General ever added the proviso for army involvement to require that the army not be armed. DB agrees that General John de Chastelain, Chief of Defense staff, is on the document titled Rules of Engagement. DB admits that there is a statement that there is no intention for the army to get involved with RCMP operations. He agrees that he was not to get involved with police law enforcement operations. He understood this to mean that the army was there in a support role, and that he was not to be involved in the law enforcement aspects. DB believes that these were the guiding principles that were followed onwards.
ST asks DB whether being asked by RCMP to ram a truck would have contradicted these rules by the General. DB says that if he was asked to do that, he would want to go over plan details first. DB agrees that the Red Bison commander never asked if ramming a civilian truck was part of the transport role they were supposed to engage in. DB says that he wasn't aware of data sheet use. He says he would have definitely asked for more details. DB says that he would have been fine about using Bison to block road. His only concern would have regarded safety of the Bison around the explosives.
Bidwell told DB that Red Bison was only used to bring ERT members to truck to effect an arrest.
L/ ST cont with Daniel Blanc - DB says that his immediate superior was Major Ferguson, located at 100 Mile House. Ferguson superior was Maj. Gen Addy in Edmonton, who was in charge of Land Forces Western Area (LFWA). Ferguson's official role was Manoeuver Force Commander. He was also in charge of EOD (Explosives Ordnance Disposal) should they be called in. Major MacDonald (a Captain during the standoff) was "G3 domestic operation liaison" with RCMP.
DB confirms that there was an "after action report" completed by Major MacDonald. DB had input into this. He doesn't believe there was an annex in this document regarding the ammo they used. Since no soldiers fired shots, no report like that was ever filed. Warrant Officer Trelnuk was responsible for signing for ammo and equipment. DB familiar with Sgt. Laws, ammo NCO in Chilliwack. DB had 280 rounds of 5.56mm ammo for personal use. He had approximately another 8,000 rounds for general army use. Trelnuk had a problem with his personal weapon, so he fired 20 rounds at an RCMP firing range to test it. DB made an entry then in Chilliwack to account for the missing 20 rounds. Ammo was waiting for them in Chilliwack. Trelnuk told him of number of rounds at beginning of mission. They were also issued 50 white smoke grenades and 20 yellow smoke grenades. DB requested CS gas (a chemical irritant for riot control), but he never got that. They got paraflares. Twelve C-7s were issued for each army personnel. Four of the soldiers stayed in Kamloops.
Military field radio was the KL-43. Never used PRC-77. They didn't have communications van monitoring radios. Says that if he needed to contact superior, he could have used ERT radio or used portable cell phone. At Zulu, he could contact commanding officer in 100 Mile House using RCMP secure cell phone. He could only do this from Zulu. He called commander when he could every couple of days to deal with logistics. If he was in the field, like on Sept. 11th, he couldn't contact commanding officer. The RCMP had a secure radio system. The KL-43 is a laptop system in which you could type in message and it would send it over the radio. They never used this because it was too time consuming.
He agrees that no member in the forces is required to obey an unlawful command. He tried to get as many briefings with his crew commanders as possible. Likewise with his commander.
There would have been another operational order document that Major Ferguson would have got from LFWA that would have been the order to put the troops on the ground. DB clarifies that the Rules of Engagement were only one annex of the total orders. Many of the orders include those to move vehicles, etc. Mostly made up of administrative orders. Operational order gives them the task, the situation, the mission, command and signals, etc. - i.e. the hows and whys of the operation.
DB doesn't think the post operation report would have specifics dealing with Sept. 11 - more general in nature. He says that his overall view was positive, but had some concerns like those dealing with security, training, unsecure communications, buses instead of flight back to Calgary. DB admits that this document would be useful to recall some of the items he had concerns about.
DB agrees that many of his notes included things that he wanted to do for training, but says that because of the time compression involved, couldn't do it all. In Chilliwack, he was able to have troops train a little driving around in the Bisons. In Kamloops, they had chalk talks (classroom discussions). DB disagrees that they were not sufficiently trained for what unfolded on Sept. 11. He says he had worked with these soldiers before and was confident that all the crew commanders acted correctly with the information they had.
Aug. 29, his notes speak of a CO's meeting with Lt. Col. Semianiev, who said that the situation was sensitive and they wanted to downplay the army's role. DB agreed that the RCMP had said that if they couldn't get armoured vehicles from the army, the RCMP would try to get them elsewhere - like buying them. The RCMP were told that the army would only provide transportation.
DB said that he heard that RCMP were going to issue the army their own vests. DB: "Yes, and that's why I wrote they suck and we kept our own." Jury and court laughs. He also thought the plasticized card sucked too because of typos and lack of clarity. They were withdrawn and it was decided that the soldiers would keep the original rules of engagement in their pockets as they had in the first place.
DB agrees that since Bidwell had these rules on him, he could have consulted them and called DB if he had any trouble with smashing a civilian truck with his Bison.
There is a note where DB is having trouble figuring out who the main boss of the ERT teams were. He says he later found out who they were. Says 14 ERT teams used. DB agrees that he heard of a team from Ottawa and Regina.
DB says that RCMP uses longitude/latitude system, while the military uses military grid system. He agrees that the RCMP system was different, but easy to adapt to. He doesn't believe difference was a handicap. He doesn't believe it's as efficient, but was able to understand a reference to being on Monkey and Lion.
He observed that the RCMP didn't have "eyes on the object". The army would have set up a forward observation post, maintaining a 24-hour watch on the camp. "No ground tactics" means the RCMP tactics were different.
Low1, Low2 and OC have conversation in notes. This was between Staff Sgt. Stuart, MacDonald, Ferguson and DB. DB didn't think RCMP suggestion that the RCMP drive and command Bisons was a good idea.
Note that he isn't close to planning process. He was disappointed because the planning was happening at the RCMP level. He says that as an officer, he wants to have as much information as possible. The next day, he's still not informed. Major MacDonald was the only soldier with input at this stage. He says he later learned that this was mainly for administrative purposes.
ST asks if DB says in his notes that CO was a "boner". DB claims that it says "OC", which is "bug spray" and they didn't have any so it was a "bummer".
DB wasn't told that on Sept. 5, RCMP had hit a branch in their vehicle, got scared, and then fired into the sky and bush at imaginary people. He was only told that he was going to pick up the RCMP.
On Sept. 11, he was briefed that there might be a surrender soon. He was not aware or briefed on the plan to disable the red truck and to arrest the occupants. Agrees that this was an operation. On the Sept. 5 extraction, he was told by RCMP where to go. He saw about a half-dozen operational plans.
"Eagle" was the insertion of RCMP on the west side of the lake. ST understands that this insertion was by air. DB says that Bisons would only be used for an extraction for medical purposes should things not work out.
DB points out Tiger South on the large aerial photo as being the 1000 Road just south of Lakeshore Road. He knows that Bidwell is involved on Tiger South.
His Sept. 10 notes about "Dream Team" refers to Elders coming in. ST asks DB if his earlier reference that there were too many chiefs with the RCMP reflects what he felt on the 11th. JF objects that this is asking for an opinion of the RCMP. ST says he wants to question the witness according to inconsistent testimony.
AB/ ST cont'd with Daniel Blanc - There was a briefing about Tiger Operational Plan. DB says that this was to do with surrender option. Note that "this was dog shit" was a reference that the RCMP were changing their plans often without letting army know. Only MacDonald was being briefed during this period. Reference to battle procedure is to the procedure gone through before a mission. ST asks how DB could know that briefing dealt with surrender option and not with disabling the truck.
Scratched out portions refer to Major ?, but DB can't remember what it referred to. ST points out that DB's notes are meticulous to a fault up until Sept. 11. DB agrees. The only notes that follow deal with his disgruntlement. DB knows that "spec fire" is speculative fire. He knows that when Yellow Bison was racing along the lakeshore between the fenceline, ERT members were firing, but he doesn't know which direction they were firing. ST wonders if the firing that occurred then was speculative at best and didn't involve protecting life. He doesn't know what the ERT members were firing at. He didn't know that the Yellow Bison had gone into safe zone along that lakeshore. The only safe zone he heard of was part of the surrender option. He had never been briefed on the safe zone. He estimated that 5,000 rounds were fired.
Had heard of "Tiger Ops Plan", but didn't know what it entailed. ST asks if the field commander wasn't aware of plans using the Bison. DB agrees that he wasn't aware of this plan. Says there were discussions at higher levels that he wasn't privy to.
Reference to "trip flares" is to RCMP-placed stun grenades that protected the "hide" (where Bisons are kept in treeline). DB says he wasn't prohibited from handling explosives. When ST asks about explosives that blew off Sgt. Schlueter's fingers, he says "hang on there, a stun grenade is not an explosive -it's a diversionary device". Laughs in the gallery.
DB agrees that Prince Rupert ERT members were firing when they were crossing the lakefront. He can't remember how many rounds were fired at that point. He says the RCMP told him that 5,000 rounds were fired by police on Sept. 11. And yet he didn't know how many army rounds were fired. Says that crew commanders didn't have a chance on the 11th to get together and have a post-operation briefing.
DB is evasive with how many rounds the average company would fire during a military exercise. He's heard of "friendly fire", but he says he was never concerned with the 5,000 rounds being fired everywhere, including in his direction.
GW - Re: person they saw while the Bison was crossing the field - he never saw that person pose a threat to him at all.
He says that Yellow Bison was the last Bison when all four Bisons exited the area. Yellow and Blue went south while Red and Green went north to Zulu.
DC - DB says that the four Bisons were situated around the perimeter of the camp on the 11th. In his notes, there is reference that the Bison was "to hit the truck to ensure they were immobilized."
DC asks if this was in line with transporting the RCMP. DB says that this was Bidwell's decision to "block the truck". DB says that the Bison brought the members close to the truck. DC: "They put the Bison on top of the truck."
DB doesn't know when Bidwell was briefed on the mission. DB only expected Bidwell to contact him if he had a concern with his mission. Bidwell didn't contact him, so DB presumes that Bidwell made the appropriate decision. DB would expect damage to a vehicle if it was hit by a Bison. He won't speculate on whether the occupants would be injured.
DB understands that the Red Bison had its steering knocked out by a tree. He heard it on the radio and had it confirmed later.
DC suggests that the plasticized rules card included manoeuver warfare theory which they felt the younger soldiers wouldn't understand, so they had it removed - plus there were typos.
DB says he never foresaw the Bison being used as a weapon of excessive force, so never planned for its possibility by including reference to it in the rules of engagement. He raised the possibility with his troops of using rifles or handguns, but never mentioned the Bison as a weapon.
DB says that rules of engagement would take precedence over RCMP orders. On Sept. 5, he saw that RCMP were hunkered down in the woods outside their vehicles. The RCMP never told him that there was no shooting - that incident was only a branch hitting a mirror.
On Sept. 11, he heard of possibility of surrender option from RCMP in general. Most everyone in the Bison was hopeful that the surrender option would happen.
When Yellow Bison raced along lakeshore, DB says that this was a diversionary move to draw fire away from the Red Bison. He doesn't know what the ERT commander had in mind when police were firing. It was around that time that he saw the person in the treeline 400 yards away. He understood that the RCMP were firing to the north. He had been told earlier that there were women and children in the camp, but DB can't be sure that the police were firing at the camp.
DB agrees that he poked his head up from his hatch to ensure that they didn't hit a tree because the view from the periscope was somewhat obstructed.
Says that the army use was secret until it made the papers after Sept. 5.
DB says that he would never order his driver to run down a native person nor would he order another driver to do the same. He doesn't want to comment on whether the Red Bison driver was told to "take out the shooter" because he isn't sure what he was told.
RCMP M-16 different from army's because RCMP fire hollow point bullets. DC suggests that the RCMP used the military C-7s for the novelty of firing a machine gun. DB: "I don't know what their requirements were."
Military members were promoted at the end of standoff and some even got citations for the way they acted.
MA - DB says he was finally told that the RCMP commanders were Tremblay and Bravner and another. He agrees that he collected field message pads from members and handed them over to MacDonald. Cards were returned too.
Five other Bisons came in after Sept. 11 and DB was in charge of them too. DB says no Grizzlies were deployed on this mission. Warrant Officer Morley would have "drawn" (procured) the ammo for these carriers. Says that he would not have known how much ammo was drawn.
DB knew there were ERT members from Ottawa and Regina because he met them.
Alcohol limit was enforced while soldiers were in field, but he allowed them some beers after the operation.
"Safety template" (safe accurate range) for M-16 is 40O metres. .308 would be 600 metres. 9mm would be 20 yards if you were lucky.
He was never given exact locations of Perch.
He doesn't know which ERT member in Yellow asked to use ammo. Cst. B.H. Anderson from Chilliwack was in Yellow. Anderson told DB to move up. DB refused because he didn't know where to go. DB says that he was waiting for radio orders from ERT command. Blue had been told to go around north route. Team leader from Prince Rupert told him to go, so they did.
* Day 49: Monday, September 30 * Day 52: Thursday, October 3 * Day 50: Tuesday, October 1 * Day 53: Friday, October 4 * Day 51: Wednesday, October 2